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Abstract 
Metropolitan smog alerts are prominent public information campaigns designed to enhance public 
health and to curb driving and other emissions.  Unlike many other voluntary information-based 
environmental policies, air quality alerts target household behavior via forecast information about 
ambient concentrations rather than firm or product characteristics.  This paper explores behaviors 
with high emissions (driving) and with high exposure (outdoor recreation) and underscores the 
difference between altruistic and risk aversion motivations.  Behavioral impacts are identified using 
the threshold nature of daily air quality forecasts.  A regression discontinuity (RD) design finds 
elderly users and exercisers tend to curtail their use of a major park following smog alerts.  The RD 
design also reveals that households do not drive less on smog alert days.  Juxtaposing high emissions 
behavior with high exposure behavior in the same study highlights how public forecast information 
may better trigger some responses and struggle to trigger others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of forecasts is often to inform and affect behavior.  For instance, metropolitan 
smog alerts serve as a key element in a public information campaign designed to curb driving and 
other emission-causing behavior.  Environmental forecasts made available to the public are 
ubiquitous in the United States.  Forecasts about snowfall, natural disasters, droughts, pollen, pest 
and infectious disease outbreaks, and a host of other phenomena range in time horizons from hours 
to centuries.  The behavioral effects of these public forecasts are often taken for granted, assumed, 
or completely neglected – rarely are they actually measured.  Yet behavioral responses to forecast 
information can be critical to achieving environmental, public health, and other goals. 
This article focuses on a specific example of using smog alerts to change behavior in Atlanta.  
Similar forecast programs exist in over 300 major cities nationwide.  This publicly available forecast 
seeks to affect ozone-producing behavior in a city with severe air quality problems, thus making it of 
particular interest to policymakers using it as a low-cost tool to improve air quality and influence 
transportation demand.  These forecasts also serve public health goals by informing residents when 
to take precaution to avoid risks.  A better understanding of the behavioral impacts of programs like 
this can inform environmental, health, and transportation policy as well as those more generally 
interested in using public information to voluntarily “nudge” behavior.  The results indicate that 
Atlanta households do not drive less under smog alerts on average, despite the aims of the state’s air 
quality plan.  They also indicate mixed effects of smog alerts on park usage, with some sensitive 
populations reducing exposure in parks following smog alerts.     
The next section frames the analysis with some policy background and a review of previous 
empirical evidence.  Key issues are highlighted next in a discussion of activity choice that 
incorporates private and public interests and distinguishes between air quality and smog alerts.  This 
general framework predicts an ambiguous effect of smog alerts on driving and a negative impact on 
outdoor activities.  The results section reports the findings of an analysis of park usage data using a 
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regression discontinuity design that leverages the discontinuous or “threshold” nature of the smog 
alert system.  The results suggest that at least the sensitive populations (elderly, exercisers) do seem 
to reduce their park use on alert days, and likely those who would otherwise do strenuous activities 
in the park become low-intensity walkers.  The analysis employs a similar method to describe the 
impacts of daily air quality forecasts on driving behavior.  The conclusions highlight the 
complications of using forecasts as part of a public information campaign.  There does seem to be 
some positive effect on informing sensitive populations to avoid air pollution-related health risks, 
but the overall influence of the public information campaign to switch to alternative travel modes is 
not evidenced in the Atlanta data.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Policy Context 
 Recent years have seen a rise in information-based and voluntary policies (Niles and Lubell 
2012).  Following the command-and-control policies typical of the major federal environmental 
legislation (e.g., CAA, CWA, ESA, RCRA), a second wave of federal environmental legislation and 
regulatory efforts has emphasized the role of information provision in improving environmental 
quality and promoting voluntary “green” or healthy behavior.  Various informational regulations like 
the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and other voluntary programs (e.g., Project XL, Energy Star, 
Green Lights, 33/50 Program) have gained prominence in the policy landscape and received 
considerable attention by researchers (e.g., Alberini and Segerson 2002, OECD 2003, Konar and 
Cohen 1997, Khanna 2001, Shapiro 2005, Koehler 2007, Shimshack et al. 2007, Darnall and Sides 
2008, Innes and Sam 2008, Brouhle et al. 2009, Bae et al. 2010).  Some voluntary programs rely more 
on information provision than others.  In a Symposium on Voluntary Environmental Programs in 
this journal, Lyon and Maxwell (2007) discuss the role of information diffusion even in voluntary 
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programs targeting firm behavior.  The more information-based policies (e.g., ecolabeling, 
certification) tend to focus on firm behavior or product labeling to drive consumer demand.    
 This analysis focuses on air quality alerts – a type of voluntary, information-based 
environmental policy that offers two important departures from this literature.  First, they target 
household-level behavior via public information provision without providing information about 
product or firm qualities.  Second, the information provided is forecast information that describes 
future environmental quality and may prove inaccurate.  Because cost-effective attainment of federal 
Clean Air Act (CAA) standards involves reducing peak air pollution levels1 rather than average air 
pollution levels, policy mechanisms to reduce emissions during episodes of especially poor air quality 
become particularly attractive to local policymakers.  Being able to forecast such episodes enables 
policymakers to enact temporary, episode-specific measures that are likely much less costly than 
permanent emissions reductions.   
 Air quality advisories target the days when it matters most – those peak pollution days when 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are violated – in an attempt to reduce 
polluting behavior.2  To achieve compliance with the NAAQS, states must submit their State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs) that demonstrate how their nonattainment area will achieve 
compliance by particular deadlines.  State regulators must select enough abatement mechanisms so 
1  Technically, it involves the average of the fourth-highest ozone levels in that year and the previous two years' 
fourth-highest ozone level.  Details on the determination of the NAAQS for each pollutant can be found at  
http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html . 
2 Air quality alerts take various forms in the 300-plus U.S. cities offering them.  Forecasts are typically issued the 
day before and accompanied by some background information and possible recommended responses.  There is 
considerable variety across cities in the information provided, pollutants being forecast, and alert threshold used.  
Some air quality alert programs are coupled with incentive-based policy changes (e.g., discounted transit) or 
mandates.  Atlanta’s Clean Air Campaign is predominantly voluntary and advisory. 
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that their projected air quality levels are in compliance.  States frequently opted for voluntary 
abatement programs in their SIPs, raising the question of how much emission reduction these 
programs yield.  The SIP for Atlanta (Georgia Department of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Protection Division 2001), for example, noted that its voluntary ozone abatement program would 
account for at least 3 percent of its emissions reduction needed to demonstrate attainment.3  The 
alert program is one such program. 
 Of course, air quality alerts may serve goals other than pollution reduction and compliance 
with the CAA.  Often, air quality alerts serve public health purposes.4  Informing residents about 
bad air quality episodes gives them information so that they can avoid or reduce exposure on those 
days.  Responses that reduce exposure may inadvertently raise emissions.  For example, commuters 
might avoid exposure by trading in their bicycles (with high exposure and low emission) for their 
cars (with low exposure but high emission) when the alert is sounded.  Unexpected or not, the 
impact of the forecast information is ultimately an empirical question.  This paper provides evidence 
on both kinds of behavioral impacts (emissions reductions, exposure avoidance) in Atlanta. 
Literature Review 
3  In its summary emissions budget calculations, the SIP includes the voluntary Partnership for a Smog-free Georgia 
(PSG) as an “off-model” source of motor vehicle emissions reductions that amount to a 5.6% reduction in VOC and 
1.8% reduction in NOx emissions.  The SIP goes so far as to refer to a 20% reduction in vehicle miles traveled in the 
region due to the PSG, expecting mobile source emissions reductions far in excess of the amount used in its 
calculations (Georgia Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Division 2001).  
4 An e-mail survey conducted of air quality forecasting agencies revealed that, among the 44 agencies responding 
(whose alerts cover 81 different regions), roughly half of the areas’ alert messages advised the public to avoid 
exposure and to reduce emissions; while a fifth only recommended avoidance behavior and a fifth only 
recommended emissions reduction.  Atlanta’s alert program includes both recommendations in its messaging. 
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Existing evidence on the public’s responsiveness to smog alerts suggests that a significant 
impact may be likely.  First, a study of Atlanta’s early smog alert program (back when it was the 
PSG) in 1998 suggests significant impacts of forecasts on driving behavior (Henry and Gordon 
2003).  They conclude that alert days were associated with 5.5 fewer miles driven per commuter, 
even more for government employees, and no significant difference in the number of driving trips.  
They also note several factors such as boredom with public information campaigns and greater 
elasticity of transportation behavior in the long-run – both of which suggest that an analysis of 
behavior in 1998, only the first year of the program, might not reflect the more long-term effects of 
public forecast information.  The present analysis uses a broader sample, controls for some 
rescheduling of trips and substitution of trips within households, and examines forecast effects at a 
later date, perhaps after the novelty of the alerts has worn off and residents adjusted their travel 
behavior.  Concurrent with Henry and Gordon (2003), Cummings and Walker (2000) examine actual 
traffic volumes in Atlanta in the summer of 1998.  Their fixed-effect approach finds that May ozone 
action days experienced somewhat less traffic volume (0.2 – 8.9 percent) than was predicted, but this 
difference may just be noise.   
Welch et al. (2005) measure the impacts of a similar smog alert program in Chicago on 
transportation behavior.  They fail to find significant effects of “Ozone Alert Days” on overall 
ridership on Chicago Transit Authority trains, but they do observe changes consistent with riders 
shifting their schedules to avoid rail travel during afternoon hours.  Their study is limited to public 
rail turnstile counts, however, lending little insight into individual responses.  It does suggest, 
however, that aggregate measures of forecast impacts may mask subtle and complex shifts in travel 
behavior. 
A series of recent studies in California investigates the effects of air quality alerts on 
behavior.  Neidell (2004, 2005a, 2009) observes indirect evidence of averting behavior (i.e., avoiding 
exposure) in response to air quality forecasts by examining how hospital visitation for respiratory 
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problems differs between days with alerts and days without alerts.  Neidell shows a particularly 
strong effect of alerts in reducing hospital visitation for children.  This suggests that people do seem 
to take precaution on those days to avoid exposure.  By tracking attendance at major Los Angeles 
institutions, Neidell (2005b) finds more direct evidence of behavioral changes in response to air 
quality alerts.  As expected, visitation at attractions associated with more outdoor activity (e.g., LA 
Zoo, Griffith Park Observatory) fell on alert days.  This is primarily due to declined in visitation by 
youth and elderly patrons, again signaling that more sensitive populations are more responsive to 
alert information.  This is also consistent other survey research showing that parents of asthmatics 
claiming to be more responsive and to have greater willingness to pay to avoid exposure for their 
children than others (McDermott et al. 2006, Mansfield et al. 2006).  Sensitive populations and those 
with lower-cost substitute activities (such as locals rather than tourists) may undertake averting 
behavior in Southern California.  Zivin and Neidell (2009) observe forecast fatigue, where behavior 
changes on the first day of an air quality episode that spans multiple days, but largely resumes its 
normal pattern by the second day.  This provides evidence consistent with the idea that ozone 
forecasts can promote averting behavior especially among sensitive populations and when substitute 
activities are low cost.  Cutter and Neidell (2009) show how smog alerts in the San Francisco Bay 
Area affect transportation behavior.  They find decreases in total daily traffic flows and insignificant 
increases in transit ridership following “Spare the Air” (STA) advisories. Sexton’s (2011b) recent 
working paper attempts to further untangle the impacts from the informational and incentive-based 
STA program. 
 The generalizability of these findings may be limited by many factors.  The results in the 
California studies may not extend well to other states and cities, especially those with different 
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transportation or recreation alternatives.5  Moreover, the quality of the forecast and its dissemination 
may differ in important ways across contexts and over time.  Programs themselves may be more 
than just informational, as the Bay Area’s Spare the Air program included free transit on alert days.  
The present analysis considers a different city (Atlanta) and, for the first time, assesses the impacts 
of smog alerts on both emission-causing behavior (driving) and averting behavior (outdoor 
recreation) in the same study area.  This should add more evidence on behavioral impacts of forecast 
information as well as allow for a direct comparison of the more private-interest responses (to 
reduce exposure) and the more public-interest responses (to reduce emissions).  Because the new 
case study city’s air quality alert program emphasizes both self-protection and emissions reduction in 
its messaging, and it does not include any special incentives on alert days (e.g., transit prices do not 
change), it offers an excellent opportunity to test the relative influences of altruistic and averting 
responses to these public alerts. 
 
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO AIR QUALITY ALERTS 
Travel Mode Choices 
 For a traveler who must choose a mode of transport, several factors likely play a role – a few 
of which are especially important in the context of air quality alerts.  We might expect a traveler to 
select a mode by weighing alternative modes’ direct travel costs (including travel time) and indirect 
costs, which includes differential exposure to environmental risks.  The modes might also be more 
than instrumental means of transport; some modes might be more or less enjoyable.  Moreover, a 
“warm glow” might be enjoyed by travelers who select more environmentally friendly modes.  
Suppose our hypothetical traveler compares available modes in terms of these costs and benefits.  
5 Sexton’s (2011) working paper uses a national sample to offer preliminary measures of an average effect in the 
U.S. 
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We might then expect their “best” option to depend these factors – potentially each of which might 
vary with air pollution levels.   
 Comparing one day with high air pollution levels to a cleaner but otherwise identical day 
might reveal a behavioral response.   Although travel times or intrinsic enjoyment of different modes 
might vary with air pollution levels, the primary interest here is with two forces affecting the mode 
decision: risk aversion and altruism.  Risk averting preferences would lead travelers to switch away 
from high-exposure modes on days with high air pollution levels.  This avoidance confers a private, 
internal benefit to the traveler in the form of better personal health.  In practice, this might mean 
avoiding walking, biking, or even waiting outside for public transit on more polluted days.  
Alternatively, an altruistic motivation might especially lead to “greener,” lower emission mode 
choices on more polluted days.  The altruistic traveler realizes benefits from “going green” and 
helping (or at least not harming) the public’s air quality.  In practice, altruistic travelers might take 
transit or travel later in the day in order to mitigate their harm to the airshed on those days.   
 It is possible, or even likely, that risk aversion and altruistic motivations push behavior in 
opposing directions.  Which force is stronger may depend on the relative strength of preferences for 
private or public gains, or on the individual’s perceived efficacy of their choice in reducing their risk 
or helping others.  As the model in Appendix B shows, the critical issue is how smog alerts alter the 
marginal costs and marginal benefits of choosing a “greener” mode.  Travelers compare how their 
private (averting) and public (altruistic) net benefits of particular mode choices change when alerts 
are issued.  While private interests might be expected to dominate, at least on average, this analysis 
focuses on air quality alerts rather than pollution levels as such.  The public alerts emphasize altruistic 
responses through messaging that calls for pro-social behavior, and alerts are sounded when 
emissions reduction produces more of a public good (i.e., attainment of the NAAQS). On balance, 
how behaviors respond to news of worsened air quality is an empirical question.   
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 For a formal, mathematical version of this discussion, see Appendix B.  This economic 
model offers a transparent and simplified characterization of the mode choice problem in order to 
highlight the ways in which air quality alerts might affect equilibrium behavior.  For decisions that 
do not involve emissions, such as the choice between running outside or walking outside for 
exercise, the choice context is much simpler.  There is no altruism component as none of the 
alternatives produce emissions.  The averting behavior remains and hypothesized behavioral 
response is a straightforward reduction in exposure. 
   
AIR QUALITY ALERTS AND REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN 
Atlanta’s ozone alert program lends itself to analysis via a regression discontinuity (RD) 
design.  The treatment – issuing a smog alert – follows clearly from the running variable, ozone level 
forecasted, exceeding a threshold (85ppb).  The forecast variable provides an observable assignment 
of each observation into either a treated (alert) or nontreated (no alert) status.  The outcome variable 
(e.g., daily miles driven) should be a continuous function of the assignment variable, and the 
treatment effect on the outcome should be visible as a discontinuity when the forecast exceeds the 
cutoff.  An advantage of the RD design is that other factors influencing behavior (e.g., weather, age, 
transit options) should vary smoothly around the threshold.  This creates an opportunity to identify 
the effect of policy treatment separate from other confounding factors using an RD design.  Lacking 
a randomized experiment, this RD design functions like a “close cousin” (Lee and Lemieux 2010) 
and offers an excellent opportunity to identify the effects of an information policy that is otherwise 
difficult to robustly detect.  The possible discontinuity will be observed via visual inspection of the 
data as well as local regressions and nonparametric RD tests in the next section. 
The design of air quality alert programs seem very well suited for evaluating using an RD 
approach.  The power of the RD design in effectively replicating a randomized experiment locally – 
i.e., for forecast values close around the threshold that triggers the alerts – is a direct consequence of 
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the assumption that individuals have at best imprecise control over their forecasted levels.  Thus, the 
most important threat to the validity of an RD design is the possibility that an individual can 
precisely manipulate the assignment variable (Lee and Lemieux 2010).  If an individual could control 
the forecasted ozone level, for instance, the RD approach would not apply.  On its face, only the 
forecasters themselves might be able to exert such direct control, and otherwise households could 
only imprecisely affect their forecasted ozone levels by manipulating the day they enter the sample.  
(Even that is minimized in this context given the unit of observation in the park usage analysis, 
discussed below, and the fact that respondents to the travel survey have their diary day randomly 
assigned.)  But, for values just above and below the threshold, they should appear independently 
distributed.  This kind of sorting around the cutoff discussed by McCrary (2008) is examined below 
for the driving behavior analysis.   
The advantages of using an RD design include its approximating a “local” randomized 
experiment and that its assumptions can actually be tested.  Implementing an RD approach requires 
the researcher to make some design choices.  This includes choices about how to graph the data and 
how to estimate regressions.  The data at hand influence these choices, so they are discussed in more 
detail below.  The general principle involves selecting bandwidths (or bin size for histograms) that 
balance the need for sufficient data density to obtain locally smooth distributions and the risk of bias 
from observations far from the threshold.  In a sense, this reflects a common between precision and 
bias.  Restricting bandwidths to very small or local values may reduce bias but comes at the expense 
of greater noise in the analysis.  Because the running variable is discrete (only integers are forecast), 
some of these design choices are simplified in this context (Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
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EVIDENCE OF SMOG FORECASTS’ EFFECTS ON OUTDOOR RECREATION 
Data 
To assess whether Atlanta’s ozone alerts encourage averting behavior and reduced outdoor 
activity raises questions about the nature of the outdoor activity.  Strenuous activities such as 
running are commonly discouraged on “red alert” days.  The analysis here focuses on behavioral 
change for outdoor activities, measuring both the amount and the intensity of that outdoor activity 
in an attempt to discern whether people reduce their outdoor recreation time or merely alter their 
type of outdoor recreation. This analysis combines data on park usage with a dataset of air quality 
forecasts for Atlanta.  Air quality modelers at the Georgia Institute of Technology provide data on 
the next-day forecasts provided to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division for use in their 
Clean Air Campaign (Chang 2005).  When the forecasted ozone levels exceed 84 parts per billion, an 
ozone alert is issued to news outlets, sent to other audiences, and posted on highway signs.  The 
alert includes suggestions to both reduce emissions (e.g., carpool, avoid refueling in the morning) 
and reduce exposure (e.g., limit outdoor exertion).   
Usage patterns of a large, central Atlanta park were recorded during the summer of 2005.  
(The Appendix describes the data collection in more detail.)  In short, two observers recorded 
passersby in Piedmont Park on 35 days, spread across different days of the week and various 
afternoon hours at two different park locations.  Seven of those days had alerts forecasted.  These 
data permit exploring several ways in which ozone levels and alerts might affect park usage.  First, 
aggregate park usage is measured as the count of passersby during a 30-minute observation period 
(i.e., a “sitting”).6  Second, the proportions of different subgroups of passersby composing that 
aggregate are also examined.  Aggregate park use variables for each 30-minute sitting are constructed 
6  The total number of visible park occupants at the beginning of each observation period can also be used to proxy 
for park usage at the time.  No significant results are evident for this measure. 
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as deviations from the average usage for a given day of the week, time period of day, location in the 
park, and coder.  Measures of aggregate park use are available for 124 instances during the summer 
of 2005.  Finally, characteristics of each group passing by the observer can be used to describe the 
types of users and uses in the park at that time.  Of course, many such groups are singletons.  
Measures of characteristics of particular groups of passersby are observed 4047 times during the 
summer.   
Given that park usage is unlikely to affect air quality and is not seen as conferring a warm 
glow effect on poor air quality days, the theoretical model above suggests that avoidance will be the 
dominant response on days with alerts.  Park use is expected to fall, and strenuous activities (e.g., 
exercise) and sensitive populations (e.g., kids, elderly) are expected to be even more responsive to 
such alerts.  In the absence of a genuine threshold effect in the health impacts of ozone, any effect 
of alerts most likely represents a behavioral impact of the program’s information campaign.   
Results 
The regression discontinuity research design lends itself well to this empirical application.  
The forecasted ozone levels serve as the running variable, and the data are examined on either side 
of the 85ppb cutoff.  To explore how the measures of outdoor recreation differ on either side of the 
cutoff, Figures 1 and 2 display the graphs showing how park usage (on the vertical axis) varies across 
the ozone forecast level.  A treatment effect of alerts would be visible as a sharp discontinuity at the 
85 ppb threshold (just to the right of the red vertical line).  Panels A, B, and C indicate total park 
use, share of users exercising, and share of users that are elderly, respectively.  Figure 1 shows simple 
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weighted average values for the outcome variables, while Figure 2 uses a nonparametric smoothing 
(around a bandwidth of 6 ppb).7   
These results show that any discontinuous impact of alerts on park usage arises at the 
individual passerby level rather than the aggregate level.  There is no significant discontinuity for the 
aggregate traffic flow at sittings at the alert threshold (Panel A in Figures 1 and 2).  There does 
appear to be a significant discontinuity for the proportion of passersby that are exercising (Panel B 
in Figures 1 and 2) and for the proportion of elderly in each group passing by (Panel C in Figures 1 
and 2).   
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Formal tests for these discontinuities, as well as several other measures of park usage for 
subpopulations or specific activities, are presented in Table 1.  Following Imbens and Lemieux 
(2008), local linear regressions are run on either side of the 85ppb cutoff to examine whether or not 
a discontinuity exists.  Nichols (2007) suggests a test for discontinuity by comparing the outcomes at 
the cutoff predicted by two different local linear regressions, one estimated above and one estimated 
below the cutoff.  This computed difference is bootstrapped (1000 replications) to allow for a test of 
discontinuity.  Alternatively, Ludwig and Miller (2007) suggest a nonparametric RD design that tests 
7 Other bandwidths were explored, and a bandwidth of 6 is chosen to best illustrate the RD design here.  Following 
Lee and Lemieux (2010), a test for whether the bandwidth is narrow enough fails to reject the hypothesis that there 
are within-bin trends in the data (p=0.29 for the share exercising; higher p-values for other activity measures).   
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for discontinuity following Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) and Porter (2003).8  Table 1 
reports the results of this RD test.  Several bandwidths for the local regression are tested to assess 
the sensitivity of results; smaller bandwidths trade off reduced bias for weaker ability to detect 
discontinuities.  The park data do not support bandwidths of 5 ppb or smaller.  Following Lee and 
Lemieux (2010), an inspection of the graphs and diagnostic tests point to desired bandwidths 
between 6 and 10 as balancing the improved precision of the estimates against introducing more 
bias.9 
The aggregate traffic flow in a given sitting exhibits no significant discontinuity at the cutoff 
for all users or various subgroups.  Elderly traffic flow is one exception, where the composition of 
elderly in the flow falls by about 2 percentage points following alerts.  Even if the aggregate flow 
remains the same around the cutoff, its make-up changes and reflects some interesting responses by 
park users.  Across many bandwidths (6 and larger), the smog alert “treatment” points to observed 
passersby being 16 – 33 percentage points less likely to be exercising.  This effect is largest when the 
bandwidth is small, suggesting a strong local impact.  To place this in context, the average passerby 
group is about 43 percent exercisers at the threshold.  Runners, a subset of exercisers, exhibit a 
8  This test arises from kernel-weighted linear regressions to the left and right on the cutoff, with the treatment effect 
calculated as the difference in the left and right limits of the regressions at the cutoff.  The triangle kernel is used 
because of its preferred boundary properties.  The standard errors are computed following Porter (2003).   
9 Around the cut-off of 85ppb, relatively little curvature is observed for most outcome variables in the park analysis, 
suggesting bandwidth choice may not matter much.  The optimal bandwidth chosen via cross-validation (Lee and 
Lemieux 2010) is between 7 and 10, depending on the outcome measure.  For total passersby, the optimal bandwidth 
may be much larger, but the conclusions are unaffected as Table 1 demonstrates. 
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similar effect (approximately 8 – 18 percentage points) from the alerts, although this effect is 
weakest and insignificant for the small bandwidth of 6.10   
The proportion of kids or elderly might also exhibit some discontinuity at the threshold if 
these sensitive populations react to the alerts.  For smaller bandwidths (≤ 10), the proportion of 
elderly in each group passing is about 0.05 lower on smog alert days.  The effect fades at large 
bandwidths.11  The proportion of kids is lower on alert days, although the effect size varies 
substantially as bandwidth varies from 6 (insignificant) to 10 (-0.14) to 20 (-0.03).  The effect on the 
proportion of females is negative 14 percentage points and significant at the smallest bandwidth (6), 
zero at the middle bandwidth (10), and 11 percentage points and positive at the larger bandwidth 
(20).  These unstable results for kids and females prevent firm conclusions.  Overall, smog alerts do 
not appear to significantly affect the aggregate park usage, even by sensitive subgroups, except for 
the elderly.  Individual groups of passersby, on the other hand, do appear affected by smog alerts – 
exercisers and elderly compose less of park users. 
The validity of the RD approach here depends on other factors that might explain park 
usage either not varying at all or varying smoothly around the cutoff point of 85ppb.  The close 
10  The significant negative effects on exercising and running on a per-passerby basis is consistent with results for 
aggregate flows per sitting.  With far fewer observations at the aggregate level, effect estimates are much less 
precise.  Nonetheless, proportion of elderly in the aggregate traffic flow falls by 10 – 14% on alert days (with p-
values less than 0.30).  The proportion of runners falls from 3 – 11%.  This gives some confirmation of the RD 
analysis done on a per-passerby basis, although imprecision remains.   
11  This negative effect is robust to a variety of bandwidths and model constructions.  If the typical group passing by 
has 5% fewer elderly on smog alert days, and aggregate park usage is unaffected by the alerts, we should expect the 
count of elderly to also fall significantly on those days.  The RD approach finds a discontinuity in counts of elderly 
per sitting, although estimated much less precisely, with elderly counts falling by -1.4, which is 2.9% of the average 
flow of 49.03 passersby per sitting.     
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correlation between temperature and ozone levels, and that weather likely affects park usage, might 
confound conventional regression approaches.  At least when ozone levels are near the 85 ppb 
threshold, however, weather variables like temperature do little to predict the alert treatment.  To 
verify this, the Porter (2003) approach used above finds a difference of less than 1 degree 
Fahrenheit, a discontinuity that is insignificant at any bandwidth.  Similarly, windspeed makes no 
significant jumps at the 85ppb threshold, while cloud cover is minor in all observations on either 
side of the cutoff (i.e., no precipitation).  Weather cannot explain why behavior changes at the 
threshold. 
In all RD analyses, sorting around the cutoff is a concern.  Piedmont Park is quite accessible 
to nearby residents and many users can easily reschedule their visits.  Thus, we might expect to see a 
lower density of observations on the righthand side of the 85ppb cutoff and more on the lefthand 
side.  This can be taken as evidence of some effectiveness of the public information campaign.  To 
test for this, the Nichols (2007) bootstrapping approach is taken to test for a discontinuity in the 
density of observations around the cutoff.  The results are inconclusive and highly sensitive to the 
choice of bandwidth.  More tellingly, a RD approach indicates that party size is significantly larger 
after smog alerts are sounded (effect = 1.1, p<0.05).  This result is consistent with solo park users 
being more elastic in response to smog alerts, as they do not have to coordinate with companions.  
It is also consistent with joggers switching to walking on alert days and walkers tending to cluster in 
the park (either in fact or in appearance to the observers). 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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EVIDENCE OF SMOG FORECASTS’ EFFECTS ON DRIVING BEHAVIOR 
Data 
This air quality public information campaign also sought to affect driving behavior to reduce 
emissions.  Assessing drivers’ sensitivity to smog alerts requires coupling air quality forecast data 
with driving behavior data.  The driving data come from the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC).  
The ARC, the formal metropolitan planning organization for Atlanta, conducted a household travel 
survey in 2001 and 2002 in order to inform its regional transportation planning.  Sampled 
households were randomly assigned two consecutive days over which each household member was 
to record their travel information.  The data were collected from April 2001 to April 2002, except 
for July.  With a response rate of 66 percent, 8,069 households completed the travel diaries, 
representing 21,323 persons, 14,449 vehicles, and 126,127 places visited during the two-day sample.  
See ARC (2003) for further details about the survey administration.   
The outcome variable of interest here is daily vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT) by households.  
The hypothesis tested is that daily VMT falls on alert days, corresponding to a primary goal of the 
alert program and a prominent metric in transportation planning.  Of course, smog alerts might 
affect other aspects of driving in Atlanta (e.g., frequency, timing, destinations).  For brevity and 
because it is the best proxy for the emitting behavior of policy interest, this analysis focuses on 
mileage of trips.  VMT is aggregated to the household level to control for within-household 
substitutions and, except where noted, the ARC’s sample weights are used.  Aggregating driving 
behavior to the household level and restricting the sample to the 2001 ozone season (May – 
September) reduces the effective sample to 991.  
Results 
Using the log of the household’s daily miles driven as the outcome variable, the data look 
noisily distributed across ozone prediction levels.  In Figure 3, there does not appear to be an 
obvious pattern in driving and ozone predictions.  More importantly, there does not appear to be a 
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significant discontinuity at the cutoff point, indicated with a vertical line.  If anything, perhaps, there 
is an increase in driving on alert days.  Figure 4 shows a similar story with histograms of average 
outcome variables across forecast levels for a variety of binwidths.  The results in Panel A of Figure 
4 differ from Figure 3 somewhat because the sample-weighted averages are used in Figure 4.  The 
results do not appear sensitive to binwidth choice.   
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Several tests for discontinuity are performed.  The results of the bootstrapped tests from 
Nichols (2007), for bandwidths ranging from 3 to 10 and for local mean smoothing or for local 
linear regression, all fail to reject the hypothesis that VMT is different above the threshold.  
Depending on the bandwidth and smoothing, (unweighted) household VMTs appear 3 – 18 percent 
higher with alerts – though none of these effects are remotely significant.  Porter’s (2003) 
nonparametric tests generally reveal similar results, except at small bandwidths (e.g., ≤ 5).  
Regardless, the discontinuity is never significant at conventional levels.  The insignificant but 
positive effects at the cutoff appear very sensitive to the sample weighting.  Using the sample 
weighting provided by ARC and examining bandwidths from 3 to 12, the nonparametric smoothing 
shows 0 – 17 percent lower household VMTs with smog alerts – though again none of these effects 
are remotely significant.  Figure 5 shows the nonparametric curves for a representative set of 
bandwidths (3, 6, and 12).  The drop-off in VMT evident at high forecasted ozone levels results 
from few observations in that range.  At the least, that drop-off and variation at lower ozone levels 
are not the result of the smog alert issued at the 85ppb threshold.   
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table 2 summarizes the results across different bandwidth selections.  It shows that 
household miles driven may fall once the 85ppb threshold is passed, but this effect is very noisy and 
indistinguishable from zero.  This conclusion is not sensitive to the choice of bandwidth.  A more 
focused analysis excludes evening driving, when emissions will not affect that day’s ozone levels.  
This RD analysis is similar, with no significant treatment effects. 
While the smog alerts may not have a significant impact when measured log-miles, perhaps 
the effect exists in linear miles.  The results across the bandwidth range also fail to reject the 
hypothesis of no treatment effect.  There are a few influential observations, however, and when the 
two households traveling over 500 miles that day are dropped (perhaps reasonable considering these 
miles are unlikely to be predominantly in the Atlanta airshed), the evidence of discontinuity becomes 
much stronger and is now statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  The ozone alerts here 
appear to cause a significant reduction in household VMTs.  This significant effect is only found in 
linear VMT with outliers dropped.  It disappears if the analysis is restricted to daytime VMTs this 
might affect peak ozone.  The insignificant threshold effects hold for log-VMT regardless of 
restricting the time of day or dropping the two influential observations. 
Table 2 also reports a test for discontinuity in household size.  This variable is not expected 
to exhibit discontinuities around the 85ppb threshold, and if it did it would call into question the 
attribution of any treatment effect to the alerts.  Household size does not appear discontinuous at 
the threshold.  Other household demographic variables (e.g., age, years of schooling, income) are 
also tested for discontinuities around the 85ppb threshold.  The results generally support the use of 
the alerts as an exogenous treatment as observations on either side of the threshold closely resemble 
each other.  As in the park usage analysis, weather variables can be tested for whether they show a 
discontinuity at the forecast alert cutoff.  Rainfall in particular may affect driving. Here, again, 
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precipitation shows no discontinuity, as it shows no variation whatsoever around the threshold.  (In 
the sample, as is typical in Atlanta, precipitation prevents ozone from reaching high levels.)   
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The possibility of sorting around the 85ppb threshold is of some importance here.  Sampled 
households cannot choose which side of the threshold they are on.  Yet the sampling design of the 
ARC travel diary survey leads to observations being dropped if that household took no trips on a 
given day.  This might lead to observations clustering on the lefthand side of the threshold if 
households responded to smog alerts by taking no trips when ozone forecasts reached 85ppb.  
Alternatively, if households tended to respond by taking at least one trip on smog alert days, there 
might be sorting to the righthand side of the threshold.  Given that non-travelers were not sampled, 
sorting by households onto one side of the cutoff or the other has substantive implications as it 
suggests the smog alert is affecting driving behavior.  This possibility is explored graphically in 
Figure 6, where the share of observations falling into each ppb ‘bin’ is plotted against local mean-
smoothed curves on the right and left of the cutoff (triangle kernel, width of 6).  The discontinuity is 
robust to different constructions (e.g., other width, local linear regression).  It appears that some 
sorting may be occurring where the threshold marks a discontinuous jump in the frequency of 
observations.  A test from Nichols (2007) shows that the density of observations is greater at the 
threshold.  The bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications to test whether local linear regressions 
(width of 6, triangle kernel) on the left and right side of the cutoff yield different density values, 
indicates a statistically significant 0.013 difference.  At different bandwidths, the density of 
observations appears 0.01 higher to the right of the cutoff.  This modest sorting is consistent with 
an increased tendency to take at least one trip on alert days, relative to similar days without an alert.  
Again, it does not support the hypothesis that the smog alert discourages trip-taking. 
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[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 In summary, there does not appear to be strong evidence of a negative effect on household 
VMTs of smog alerts in Atlanta in the summer of 2001.  There could be many reasons for this, 
including offsetting effects of private interests (i.e., driving to avoid exposure) and public interests 
(i.e., taking transit to contribute to the public good) as described in the theoretical model above.12  
Alternatively, the smog alerts may have low salience and low dissemination, or travelers may simply 
be very inelastic in their short-run travel demand.  Perhaps the strongest evidence of a treatment 
effect comes in the discontinuity in the density at the cutoff.  Sorting appears somewhat likely, 
consistent with households being more likely to take a driving trip on the righthand side of the 
cutoff than the left.  
 The results for both the park visitation and the household driving analyses are subject to 
some important limitations.  Both datasets rely heavily on measures of behavior that could include 
error or even bias.  Student observers in the park may mistakenly code some passersby.  Travel diary 
respondents may incorrectly recall their daily activity.  In both cases, this approach assumes 
measurement error in the outcome variables is independent of that day’s air quality level.  For the 
travel diary analysis, this dataset – with all its limitations – has been frequently used by Atlanta’s 
regional transportation planners.  The park use data, conversely, is a novel observational approach to 
collecting data inexpensively.  Accordingly, it lacks a richer set of demographic control variables 
12 If the alerts triggered different behavioral responses in different households such that they offset and the average 
response appeared minimal (i.e., some households altruistically reduced VMT while others drove more to avoid 
exposure), then the variance in the VMT measure should exhibit a discontinuity at the threshold.  For this sample, 
the standard deviation of household VMT actually falls from 1.23 below the threshold (and above 83ppb) to 1.06 
above the threshold (and below 87ppb).  Offsetting appears unlikely to account for this. 
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(making the RD design even more appealing) and lacks external validity checks.  In both cases, as 
the original datasets had no overt connection or design features related to air quality whatsoever, the 
threat of air quality issues biasing the data is minimized. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The impact of public forecasts on decisions and behavior has been demonstrated in sectors 
like the environment, transportation, and health.  Air quality forecasts operate at the nexus of all 
three sectors.  Smog alerts’ impact on many behaviors (e.g., jogging, walking, driving) in Atlanta are 
complex and results are mixed.  The RD approach offers substantial improvements in research 
design over previous research in Atlanta.  Juxtaposing high emissions behavior (driving) with high 
exposure behavior (park use) in the same study area highlights how public forecast information may 
better trigger some responses and struggle to trigger others.   This is especially likely when private 
and public interests may appear incompatible for some behaviors (commuting) and not for others 
(exercising).  Thus, the failure find robust evidence of negative impacts of smog alerts on VMT in 
Atlanta comes as little surprise, despite the aims of the Clean Air Campaign.  The RD approach does 
show, on the other hand, that the elderly and exercisers may be quite responsive in terms of 
avoiding outdoor recreation.  Responsiveness by subgroups may be masked when looking at 
aggregate measures. 
The role of forecasts as a policy may be more nuanced than some imagine, especially when 
forecasts are used to affect the outcome being forecast.  Assumptions that “more information is 
better” or that public forecasts represent neutral information provision may not hold up in practice.  
Forecast information may not have the desired or even intuitive effects.  Smog alerts may 
inadvertently encourage pedestrians to seek shelter in cars.  Moreover, these public forecasts may 
have dramatically different effects in different contexts.  Some areas or activities may have few 
‘marginal’ decisionmakers, for whom new public forecast information pushes them past a tipping 
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point and into a new behavior.  This might partly explain why these results depart from previous 
work.  Fewer or more costly alternative travel modes in Atlanta relative to San Francisco could help 
account for the difference in driving responses.  Future research would do well to provide evidence 
explaining the regional variation in responsiveness.  
This empirical analysis takes advantage of the discontinuous or threshold nature of the 
ozone alert program.  This allows the effect of the forecast or alert to be disentangled from the 
effect of the ozone levels themselves.  While this peculiar design feature of the public policy is a 
boon for program evaluation researchers, it may not make for good policy.  It raises interesting 
questions for policy design.  The color-coded air quality alert system, not unlike other public 
information campaigns like the former Homeland Security Advisory System, simplifies the messages 
and converts continuous risk or safety information into a categorical signal.  Preprocessing the data 
may substantially affect behavior.  Simpler messages have important consequences for public use of 
the information, one possible implication being that worsening air quality will only affect behavior if 
it crosses some threshold.  This entails lost opportunities for averting behavior for air quality 
changes that do not cross thresholds.  Conversely, time and cognitive costs of more information 
may imply that less information elicits more reaction.  When there is no special health effect 
associated with the threshold, this begs a question of whether the forecast information is being 
optimized to promote public health (or, perhaps, to elicit volunteers to help achieve compliance with 
the NAAQS).  Given cognitive limits, a significant behavioral response at an arbitrary point may be 
better than a muted response across a wider range of circumstances.   
The results from the RD approach suggest that ozone alerts have little influence on emitting 
behavior like driving – in contrast to some earlier work in Atlanta and to recent results for San 
Francisco.  The variation in forecast impacts over space and time warrant systematic research efforts 
to progress our understanding of this prevalent policy tool beyond single-city case studies.  One 
novel aspect of this study is the application of an RD approach in the same city to activities that 
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likely have tensions between private and public interests, such as driving, and also to activities with 
predominantly private interests, such as park use.  The results offer more evidence that forecasts 
effectively foster averting behavior but have limited stimulation of altruistic responses from drivers 
at least in Atlanta.  That averting behavior is facilitated in both Atlanta and the California settings 
may be heartening for proponents of information-based policies, whereas the absence of similar 
impacts on driving behavior in Atlanta may owe to paucity of alternative transit options in this 
setting.  Other explanations worth examining include differences in alert awareness, in content and 
dissemination of the alerts, in alert program longevity and incentives, and in population 
characteristics.  Further research is needed to explore how forecast information affects different 
choice settings and different decisionmakers. 
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APPENDIX A:  DATA COLLECTION IN PIEDMONT PARK 
During the summer of 2005, two undergraduate students were trained to make observations 
in a prominent, central Atlanta park (www.piedmontpark.org).  At each sitting, the observer would 
sit on a park bench and look ahead at a fixed point across the path.  He would record the 
characteristics of each group passing in front of him for a 30-minute spell.  Then, he would move to 
another location in the park for another similar sitting.  The seating location and fixed point was 
identical across all sittings for each of the two locations.  One park location, at the main (western) 
pedestrian entrance, was selected for maximum traffic.  The other park location, near the other 
(southwestern) primary pedestrian entrance, was selected to capture predominantly exercisers and 
those taking laps around Lake Clara Meer.  Their unit of observation was a “group passing by”.   
Each group was coded for the time of observation, the size of the party (mean = 1.92, median = 1) 
as well as several other characteristics (e.g., mode of travel, activity, dogs, age, gender).  Multiple 
activities were coded according to whether the passersby were observed to be exercising, socializing, 
playing, taking care of children, etc.  Age codes were limited to how many passerby were clearly over 
age 60, how many were clearly under age 15, and how many were toddlers or younger.  Because 
there was no interaction whatsoever with park users, and given the difficulty of estimating ages of 
people passing by, the age observations may be inaccurate.  (For purposes of this study, this might 
not systematically bias the results, or it might introduce measurement error that serves to attenuate 
the estimated effects.)  At the beginning and end of each sitting, the observer would record the total 
number of people visible from their position (whether they were passing by or not).   
The sittings were scheduled for Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays, and Saturday.  (The 
Monday, July 4 date was switched to July 5.)  On each weekday, four sittings were scheduled.  The 
first began at one location around noon, the second commenced at the other location approximately 
38 minutes later.  The third sitting began at one location around 5:00pm, followed about 38 minutes 
later by the fourth sitting at the other location.  On weekend dates, only two sittings were scheduled 
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(one for each location) with a start time at approximately 2:00pm.  (The start times for the first 
sitting ranged from 11:00am to 1:45pm with an average of 12:04.  The start times for the third sitting 
ranged from 3:40 to 5:30 with an average of 4:45pm.)  The dates ranged from May 27 to August 1.   
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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APPENDIX B:  A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF MODE CHOICE AND AIR QUALITY 
 Consider a model of a traveler who must choose a mode of transport.  For simplicity, 
variables will be presented here in continuous form, although reality likely constrains many to be 
discrete choices.  The advantage to presenting the decision model in mathematical form is in its 
transparency and precision.  This lets the analyst clarify which and how factors influence choices and 
strips away nonessential elements.  Let the actor’s utility (U) depends on travel time (T), exposure to 
environmental risks (E), and a “warm glow” (G) feeling from making an environmentally friendly 
choice.  Assume that U = U(T, E, G) is increasing in G and decreasing in T and E.  Let M describe 
the mode choice.  In a discrete setting, M = 0 for drivers, and M = 1 for those taking public transit 
or walking.  In a continuous setting, M might span a continuum from driving alone (M = 0) to 
walking (M = 1), with other modes such as rail, bus, and biking ranging in between.  As M increases, 
travel times T increase as well as exposure E (i.e., TM > 0, EM > 0).  Let environmental exposure 
E = E(M; P) where P is ambient pollution concentrations and EP ≥ 0.  Let travel time T = T(M; A, 
M~i), where A is a binary “smog alert” and M~i represents congestion or the average amount of M 
chosen by other travelers.  Assume that TMA ≥ 0 as the additional travel time of “going green” is 
unlikely to be less on smog alert days and may even be more (Niedell and Cutter 2007).  Further, 
assume the marginal exposure penalty of greener travel does not fall on alert days.  EMA should be 
positive if exposure is effectively zero when M = 0, regardless of pollution levels, and alerts correlate 
with P.  The warm glow G = G(M; A) such that GM ≥ 0 and GMA > 0 as “going green” contributes to 
a warm glow feeling, and this marginal utility increases when an alert has been sounded.13  Finally, 
assume that the individual decisionmaker is inconsequential as far as affecting congestion (i.e., 
13  The essential assumption here is that the effect of A on the marginal utility of G be positive (i.e., ∂UG/∂A > 0).  
This is done by assuming GMA > 0 and UGA = 0. Alternatively, this could be modeled as G = G(M) such that GM ≥ 0 
and UGA > 0.  In that case, the UGGMA term in equation (1) can be replaced by UGAGM with equivalent effect. 
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∂M~i/∂M ≡ M~iM = 0) and affecting air pollution (i.e., ∂P/∂M ≡ PM = 0).  Of course, in the 
aggregate, these trivial impacts of individuals might amount to significant impacts.  The traveler thus 
takes A, P, and M~i as given. 
 The actor chooses M to maximize U, leading to first-order conditions that: 
 UM = UTTM + UEEM + UGGM ≥ 0 
The second-order conditions (UMM < 0) are likely to hold unless UTM >> 0.14  For a traveler who has 
selected an optimal mode M* in equilibrium, the policy question is how exogenous shocks to P and 
A affect M*.  For alerts: 
 UMA = UTATM + UTTMA + UEAEM + UEEMA + UGGMA   
As long as alerts do not affect the marginal disutility of travel time and exposure, this expression 
reduces to: 
UMA = UTTMA + UEEMA + UGGMA 
The first two terms are nonpositive while the last one (UGGMA) is positive.  Thus, whether drivers 
switch to higher or lower M values depends on whether the alert has a greater effect on the disutility 
of travel time and exposure or a greater effect on the warm glow of contributing to the public good.  
The inequality condition is: 
(1) [ ] 0*
*
>
<
≡
∂
∂
⇒
<
>
+− AMAGMAEMAT MA
MGUEUTU  
14  That “going green” effects a much smaller disutility of time is an important point of emphasis in many marketing 
campaigns for public transit, including Atlanta’s.  This model supports this marketing strategy, as a decision-maker 
convinced that UTM is very large will tend in equilibrium to eschew driving in favor of greener alternatives.  
Assuming that UGM = UEM = 0, UMM = UTMTM +UTTMM + UEEMM + UGGMM.  It seems reasonable to expect that 
TMM ≥ 0 and GMM ≤ 0, as there is probably declining warm glow returns to greener modes just as travel times rise at 
an increasing rate with greener modes. 
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When an alert sounds, drivers who perceive greater altruistic impacts of taking an alternative model 
and lesser adverse effects of not driving on their travel times and exposure will tend to switch.  
Conversely, those travelers not driving may begin driving when an alert is sounded if they perceive 
greater health or congestion costs associated with their alternative modes and relatively minor warm 
glow losses from driving on alert days.   
The relative magnitudes of TMA, EMA, and GMA are obviously important in understanding 
mode switching behavior – whether the traveler undertakes averting behavior (and drives) or 
altruistic behavior (and takes transit).  This is the most important insight from this model.  The 
magnitude that matter most are the impacts of alerts on the marginal (time-saving, exposure-
reducing, or glow-generating) effects of mode choice and not the direct marginal impact of alerts on 
travel time, exposure, or warm glow.  Public officials might seek to influence these critical factors via 
advertising or, for TMA, reducing congestion in alternative modes on alert days.  Arguably, EMA = 0 
because there is no special threshold effect of pollution exposure associated with the alert.  (For the 
8-hour average ozone level with an alert sounded at 85ppb, EM is virtually the same at 84ppb and 
85ppb.)  This makes MA* > 0 more likely to hold in condition (1).  Yet if travelers are generally 
unaware of P and use A to proxy for it, then EMA is quite likely to be nonzero (and likely positive as 
air pollution disproportionately affects travelers in alternative modes).  Moreover, UEA may be 
negative as travelers perceive greater marginal health risks during a smog alert.  It follows that  
(2) [ ] 0*
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In equation (1) or (2), compared to EMA = 0, the circumstances when A proxies for P appear less 
favorable to MA* > 0.  Disseminating the crude indicator with an impression that threshold effects 
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exist can undermine the effectiveness of the alert program.  There is still ambiguity in the prediction, 
however.15   
Modeling Other Exposure Choices 
 The economic model developed here describes a particular choice – which mode of 
transportation to use for a given trip – but speaks to a more general sort of decision.  This approach 
might apply to any decision that affects the decisionmaker’s exposure or risk and garners the 
decisionmaker some warm glow under certain conditions.16  Here, a tradeoff exists between what is 
selfishly desirable (driving to reduce risk and travel time) and publicly desirable (not driving to 
reduce emissions).  Whether altruistic actors opt for the “green” behavior in response to a public 
alert depends on the relative weights of this tradeoff – some of which policymakers can directly 
influence.  The model shows some ambiguous results, especially when the alert is also the 
decisionmaker’s sole proxy for environmental risk.  
15  From a public information campaign perspective, this model highlights a tension around the current, binary “red 
alert” system.  Portraying a threshold effect in the alert system may encourage driving on bad days to protect one’s 
health, but such a threshold may be necessary to spur altruists to action on those days.  An incremental signal of 
pollution might prove too weak a signal to trigger UG to rise.   
16  Suppose that M describes the location of a non-emitting activity, like exercise, whether it is exclusively indoors 
(0) or outdoors (1).  The first-order condition above has UGGM = 0, and assume that UTTM = 0.  This leaves the 
inequality condition in equation (1) as merely UEEMA < 0 ⇒ MA* < 0.  The alert unambiguously leads to less outdoor 
(high-exposure) activity.  Relaxing the assumption that UTTM = 0 might alter this, if we allow for differential travel 
costs for indoor activities.  Suppose that the alternative to jogging outside is to exercise in a gym, which might 
charge or be less convenient (i.e., TM < 0).  If the inconvenience of indoor activities increases with alerts (i.e., TMA > 
0), the equation (2) returns to ambiguity as the decision-maker weighs the additional exposure against the addition 
inconvenience associated with alerts.  This inconvenience might arise if gyms become congested or charge extra on 
alert days. 
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Figure 1: Mean (for binwidth=1) of total passersby, exercising passersby, elderly passersby  
 
 
* Note: Means are shown at various ozone forecast levels.  The total passersby outcome variable 
is measured per sitting, as a deviation from the mean as described in the text.  The shares of 
exercising passersby and elderly passersby variables are measured on a per party passing by 
basis, with means weighted by party size.  See the Appendix for more data details. 
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Figure 2: Nonparametric discontinuity (bandwidth = 6) of total passersby, exercising 
passersby, elderly passersby 
 
 
 
* Note: Means are shown at various ozone forecast levels.  The total passersby outcome variable 
is measured per sitting, as a deviation from the mean as described in the text.  The shares of 
exercising passersby and elderly passersby variables are measured on a per party passing by 
basis, with means weighted by party size.  See the Appendix for more data details. 
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Table 1:  Estimation results from RD analysis of Piedmont Park data 
    Estimated treatment effect 
(std. err.) 
N receiving positive weight 
Variable # of 
obs. 
mean at 
cutoff 
Bandwidth 
6 10 20 
Total passersby per 30-minute 
sitting (measured in 
deviations from mean) 
124 23.0846 7.320 
(30.1895) 
N=24 
-7.423 
(23.3713) 
N=32 
-4.518 
(20.9861) 
N=62 
Proportion of total passersby 
exercising per 30-min. sitting 
(measured in deviations) 
124 0.0561 -0.136 
(0.1277) 
N=24 
-0.129 
(0.0926) 
N=32 
-0.100 
(0.0694) 
N=62 
Proportion of total passersby 
as kids per 30-minute sitting 
(measured in deviations) 
124 0.0278 0.082 
(0.0896) 
N=24 
-0.019 
(0.0645) 
N=32 
-0.018 
(0.0419) 
N=62 
Proportion of total passersby 
as elderly per 30-min. sitting 
(measured in deviations) 
124 0.0137 -0.014 
(0.0119) 
N=24 
-0.020** 
(0.0086) 
N=32 
-0.017** 
(0.0066) 
N=62 
      
Group passing by is 
exercising (weighted by  
group size) 
4256 0.4260 -0.327** 
(0.0579) 
N=1123 
-0.265** 
(0.0450) 
N=1410 
-0.156** 
(0.0337) 
N=2426 
Group passing by is running 
(weighted by  group size) 
3683 0.2427 -0.078 
(0.0538) 
N=914 
-0.169** 
(0.0433) 
N=1185 
-0.177** 
(0.0308) 
N=2130 
Proportion of kids in group 
passing by (weighted by  
group size) 
4258 0.1982 0.010 
(0.0315) 
N=1124 
-0.138** 
(0.0217) 
N=1409 
-0.027** 
(0.0164) 
N=2412 
Proportion of elderly in group 
passing by (weighted by  
group size) 
4258 0.0584 -0.053** 
(0.0132) 
N=1124 
-0.048** 
(0.0089) 
N=1412 
-0.014** 
(0.0063) 
N=2412 
Proportion of females in group 
passing by (weighted by  
group size) 
4258 0.2275 -0.142** 
(0.0431) 
N=1124 
0.010 
(0.0335) 
N=1412 
0.113** 
(0.0268) 
N=2412 
*, ** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% level, respectively. 
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Figure 3:  ln(household miles driven) by ozone prediction 
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Figure 4:  Weighted average of ln(VMT), for binwidth=1, 2, 3 
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Figure 5:  Nonparametric discontinuity in ln(VMT), bandwidth = 3, 6, 12 
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Table 2:  Estimation results from RD analysis of travel diary data 
    Estimated treatment effect 
(std. err.) 
N receiving positive weight 
Variable # of 
obs. 
mean at 
cutoff 
Bandwidth 
3 6 12 
ln(household miles driven 
that day), weighted 
1023 3.8204 -0.275 
(0.3970) 
N=155 
-0.169 
(0.2773) 
N=183 
-0.088 
(0.2050) 
N=372 
ln(household miles driven 
before 5pm that day), 
weighted 
931 3.0302 -0.247 
(0.3425) 
N=139 
0.159 
(0.2675) 
N=165 
0.277 
(0.2220) 
N=338 
ln(household miles driven 
that day), weighted; 
miles>500 dropped 
1021 3.8204 -0.121 
(0.3855) 
N=154 
-0.216 
(0.2724) 
N=182 
-0.129 
(0.2022) 
N=371 
      
household miles driven that 
day, weighted 
1200 83.0679 . 
(38.9423) 
N=181 
-25.227 
(24.9093) 
N=211 
-16.254 
(15.9073) 
N=431 
household miles driven that 
day, weighted; miles>500 
dropped 
1198 83.0679 -50.676* 
(28.2787) 
N=180 
-37.640* 
(19.3224) 
N=210 
-27.260** 
(12.5004) 
N=430 
household miles driven 
before 5pm that day, 
weighted 
1145 22.4691 -45.143 
(29.8319) 
N=175 
12.185 
(18.6179) 
N=203 
12.117 
(12.6389) 
N=414 
household miles driven 
before 5pm that day, 
weighted; miles>500 dropped 
1143 22.4691 . 
(9.1062) 
N=174 
-0.565 
(7.7584) 
N=202 
0.464 
(6.8999) 
N=413 
      
household size, weighted 1200 2.7439 0.248 
(0.4682) 
N=181 
-0.194 
(0.3422) 
N=211 
-0.162 
(0.2687) 
N=431 
*, ** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% level, respectively. 
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Figure 6:  Density of observations (i.e., “share”) across ozone forecast levels 
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Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics from Piedmont Park Sample 
Variable # obs. mean std. dev. min max 
(per sitting)      
Total passersby 124 49.03 39.92 4 230 
Total exercising passersby 124 16.55 12.92 0 67 
Total running passersby 124 12.46 9.34 0 52 
Total kid passersby 124 4.72 10.40 0 77 
Total elderly passersby 124 0.89 1.41 0 6 
(per party)      
Time of day 4047 15.18 2.25 11.02 18.6 
Day of week (Mon.= 1) 4047 3.29 1.97 1 6 
Number of people 4047 1.50 1.39 1 46 
Number of elderly (over 60) 4047 0.03 0.20 0 3 
Number of toddlers or younger 4047 0.03 0.21 0 4 
Number of kids 4047 0.14 1.13 0 43 
Number of females 3933 0.32 0.65 0 5 
Exercising? 4045 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Strolling? 4045 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Relaxing? 4045 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Childcare? 4045 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Socializing? 4045 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Primary mode:  walk 3683 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Primary mode:  run 3683 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Primary mode:  bike 3683 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Primary mode:  skate 3683 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Primary mode:  other 3683 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Forecasted ozone alert? 4047 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Forecasted ozone level 4047 68.52 15.44 36 105 
 
 
 
